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1On the Key Generation from Correlated Wireless
Channels
Junqing Zhang, Biao He, Member, IEEE, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Roger Woods, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This letter investigates the secret key capacity of
key generation from correlated wireless channels in a source
model. We systematically study a practical scenario by taking
into account all relevant parameters including sampling delay,
eavesdroppers’ location, qualities of legitimate and eavesdropping
channels, Doppler spread, and pilot length. Our findings indicate
that secret key capacity is determined by the cross correlation
of the channel measurements, and a better legitimate channel is
not necessary when the correlation between legitimate channels
is higher than correlation between legitimate and eavesdropping
channels. We also find that it is possible to tune the secret
key capacity by carefully designing the sampling delay, pilot
length, and channel qualities. This letter offers practical design
guidelines on secure key generation systems.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, secret
key capacity
I. INTRODUCTION
Key generation extracts common randomness of the un-
predictable features residing in wireless channels between
users [1]. By alternately and separately measuring their com-
mon channel, the legitimate users, namely Alice and Bob,
can obtain highly correlated channel measurements. With a
key generation protocol including quantization, information
reconciliation, and privacy amplification, the users can estab-
lish a common cryptographic key through the noisy channel
measurements [1].
The security performance of key generation is characterized
by the secret key capacity, which was first derived and formal-
ized in [2], [3]. The scenario that Alice and Bob are observing
the same Gaussian random source and the mutual information
between their noisy and correlated observation was studied
in [4]. The work in [5] investigated key generation over
temporally correlated fading channels and derived the secret
key capacity between two legitimate users. By taking into
account the effects of channel qualities and channel estimation,
a more practical implementation and setup was considered
in [6]. Spatial decorrelation was experimentally studied in [7]–
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However, a general analysis of the secret key capacity
is missing. Many commercial wireless transceivers are half-
duplex, and the sampling delay will impact the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob. In addition, the information
leaked to eavesdroppers will decrease the secret key capacity,
or even render an insecure key generation system when
eavesdroppers have a better correlation such as when they are
very close to the legitimate users. These effects are essential
for the design of secure key generation systems, however, they
have not been considered in previous work.
In this letter, we carry out a complete and rigorous analysis
on the secret key capacity by considering a more general
and practical scenario and taking into account sampling delay
and eavesdropping. We first derive the analytical expression
of secret key capacity and then validate it by Monte Carlo
simulations. We find that the secret key capacity is determined
by the cross correlation of the channel measurements and a
better legitimate channel is not required in order to achieve
a positive secret key capacity, as long as the correlation
between the measurements of legitimate users are higher
than the correlation between measurements of legitimate user
and eavesdropper. We analyze the effects of all the relevant
parameters including correlation relationship of legitimate and
eavesdropping channels, channel estimation, sampling delay,
and provide guidelines on the design of a practical and secure
key generation system.
Notation: Lower case letters and bold lower case letters de-
note scalar and vector, respectively. (·)† denotes the conjugate
transpose, and E{·} is the expectation operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A key generation source model1 is shown in Fig. 1, which
includes Alice and Bob, and an eavesdropper, Eve, located d
meters away from Bob. Without loss of generality, only the
scenario that Eve observes Alice’s transmission is considered.
In the source model, the users measure their common channel,
and will get noisy but correlated observations. Key generation
usually works in time-division duplex (TDD) mode and all
the users run at the same frequency, therefore, the uplink
and downlink channels are reciprocal. As shown in Fig. 2,
at time ta(i) = iTs, where Ts is the sampling period and
i = 0, 1, ...,M − 1, Alice sends out a packet, through which
Bob and Eve can measure the channel. At time tb(i) = iTs+τ ,
where τ is the sampling delay, Bob also sends out a packet
and Alice can carry out the channel measurement.
1Key generation channel model is not considered in this letter.
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Fig. 2. Timing of the measurements
In this letter, we consider a time-varying Rayleigh fading
channel with a Jakes Doppler spectrum, hab ∼ CN (0, σ2h) and
the autocorrelation function of the channel gain is given as
ρ(hab(ta), hab(tb)) =
E{hab(ta)†hab(ta + τ)}
σ2h
= J0(2pifdτ) = r1(τ), (1)
where J0(·) is a zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind,
fd is the maximum Doppler shift. The eavesdropping channel
is also a Rayleigh fading channel, hae ∼ CN (0, σ2hae). It is
related to hab as [10]
hae =
1√
β
(r2(∆d)hab +
√
1− r2(∆d)2ω), (2)
where β = σ2h/σ
2
hae
, r2(∆d) = J0(2pi∆d), ∆d = dλ , λ is
the length of waveform, and ω ∼ CN (0, σ2h). The correlation
between hab and hae can be calculated as
ρ(hab(t), hae(t)) =
E{hab(t)†hae(t)}
σhσhae
= r2(∆d), (3)
which allows us to model the spatial decorrelation and analyze
its effect on the secret key capacity.
The channel can be measured by sending pilot sequence s
from the transmitter u to the receiver v, {u, v} = {a, b, e}. In
a block fading channel, channel gains remain the same during
the pilot transmission. The received signal can be written as
yv = huvs + nv, (4)
where nv is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the
receiver v with variance σ2nv , and huv is the channel gain.
The receiver can then estimate the channel using least square
(LS) method as
ĥuv =
s†
||s||2yv = huv +
s†
||s||2nv, (5)
and
σ2
ĥuv
= σ2huv +
σ2nv
||s||2 = σ
2
huv +
σ2nv
Plp
, (6)
where P is the instantaneous transmission power and lp is the
length of s. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the channel is
γuv =
Pσ2huv
σ2nv
. (7)
Assuming all the users have the same noise power σ2n, so that
γab = βγae. The mean-square error (MSE) of LS estimation
can be given as
ηuv =
1
γuvlp
. (8)
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The secret key capacity, C ĥSK [11], is
C ĥSK = I(ĥab, ĥba)− I(ĥab, ĥae). (9)
In this section, we derive the secret key capacity of the
key generation source model and analyze all the relevant
parameters.
As the users are running at the same carrier frequency,
according to the channel reciprocity, hba(t) = hab(t), then
ρ(hab(ta), hba(tb)) = ρ(hab(ta), hab(tb)) = r1(τ).
The cross correlation coefficient between ĥuv and ĥtr can
be given as
ρ(ĥuv, ĥtr) =
1√
1 + ηuv
√
1 + ηtr
ρ(huv, htr), (10)
where {t, r} = {a, b, e}.
Because huv , htr, ĥuv and ĥtr follow Gaussian distribution,
their mutual information [12] can be calculated as
I(huv, htr) = −1
2
log2(1− ρ(huv, htr)2), (11)
I(ĥuv, ĥtr) = −1
2
log2(1− ρ(ĥuv, ĥtr)2). (12)
The secret key capacity can be derived as
C ĥSK =
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ(ĥab, ĥae)2
)− 1
2
log2
(
1− ρ(ĥab, ĥba)2
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 + ηab − r2(∆d)
2
1+βηab
1 + ηab − r1(τ)21+ηab
)
. (13)
C ĥSK is affected by parameters including ηab (equivalently γab
and lp), r1(τ) (equivalently τ and fd), r2(∆d) (equivalently
∆d), and β.
In order to obtain a positive C ĥSK , the variable of the
logarithm function log(x) should be larger than one and the
condition can be written as
α =
( r2(∆d)2
1 + βηab
)
/
( r1(τ)2
1 + ηab
)
< 1. (14)
⇒ β >
[r2(∆d)2
r1(τ)2
− 1
]
γablp︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
+
r2(∆d)
2
r1(τ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2
= β′. (15)
• When r2(∆d) < r1(τ), β1 < 0, β2 < 1, then β′ < 1.
There always exists values β′ < β < 1.
• When r2(∆d) ≥ r1(τ), β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 1, then β′ ≥ 1.
Therefore β > β′ ≥ 1.
3When r2(∆d) < r1(τ), even eavesdroppers have a higher
SNR than the legitimate users, as long as they do not have
a better channel correlation, the system can still generate keys
securely. Even when r2(∆d) ≥ r1(τ), legitimate users can
still achieve a positive secret key capacity by improving their
channel quality, or deteriorating the eavesdropping channels
such as introducing artificial noise.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DESIGN GUIDELINES
In this section, we analyze effects of all the parameters
through simulation and offered insights to design a secure key
generation system. I(ĥuv, ĥtr) and C ĥSK can be calculated by
(12) and (13), respectively. Besides the results of the noisy
channel measurements, we showed the results of the noiseless
channel as a comparison, where I(huv, htr) can be calculated
by (11) and ChSK is given as
ChSK = I(hab, hba)− I(hab, hae). (16)
We also carried out the Monte Carlo simulations to validate
our analytical analysis. For each simulation, we ran M =
100, 000 times. We then used a method based on k-nearest
neighbor (knn) distances [13] to numerically compute the
mutual information. In all the figures below, lines represent
the analytical results and markers (o) represent the numerical
results calculated by knn method. As observed from the
figures, the numerical and analytical results matched very well.
The mutual information are affected by the channel qualities
between Alice, Bob, and Eve. The effect of β, i.e., the ratio of
legitimate channel’s SNR and eavesdropping channel’s SNR,
is evaluated by applying two examples and the results are
shown in Fig. 3. In the setting of Fig. 3a, β′ = −48.947,
therefore β > β′ always holds, which can be seen from the
figure. When 0 < β < 1, the legitimate channel quality is
not as good as the eavesdropping channel, but the system is
still secure. However, when the eavesdropper is much closer
to Bob, as shown in Fig. 3b, β′ = 17.678, the legitimate
channel’s SNR should be at least 17.678 times higher than
the eavesdropping channels’ SNR, in order to obtain a better
correlation between the channel measurements and thereof a
positive C ĥSK . In a slow fading channel with fd = 10 Hz and
a sampling delay τ = 0.01 s, only when ∆d < fdτ = 0.1, the
system may not be secure. In a 2.4 GHz system, this distance
is d = 0.1 × c/fc = 0.1 × 3 × 108/(2.4 × 109) = 1.25 cm,
which is quite short and the legitimate users will be aware
whenever the eavesdroppers are so close to them.
As shown in (8), the channel estimation performance is
affected by the SNR and pilot. Their effects on the key
generation performance are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5,
respectively. In a low SNR environment, the channel esti-
mation performance is affected by the noise and the mutual
information I(ĥab, ĥba) is very small. A longer pilot performs
better in suppressing the noise effect and improving the key
generation performance.
The mutual information is also affected by the sampling
delay and channel variations. The sampling delay, τ , will
affect the measurements correlation between Alice and Bob.
As shown in Fig. 6, a τ that is too small does not help to
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C ĥSK
ChSK
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Fig. 3. Mutual information change versus β. r1(τ) = 0.9037, fd = 10 Hz,
τ = 0.01 s, γab = 10 dB, and lp = 10.
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Fig. 4. Mutual information change versus SNR γab. lp = 10, fd = 10 Hz,
τ = 0.01 s, β = 0.1, and ∆d = 0.2.
get a high secret key capacity. When the values of ρ(ĥab, ĥba)
and ρ(hab, hba) are very close to one, although ρ(ĥab, ĥba)
is only slightly smaller than ρ(hab, hba), I(ĥab, ĥba) is much
smaller than I(hab, hba). This is because the logarithm func-
tion log(x) decreases quickly when x is close to zero. Most
of the published key generation systems are applied in slow
fading channels and the analysis in a fast fading channel
has never been discussed. As shown in Fig. 6b, when τ is
smaller than 0.001 s, the system can still get a positive secret
key capacity. This requirement is relatively easy to meet. It
has been reported in [9] that a key generation system with
τ = 60× 10−6 s is designed. The mutual information change
versus Doppler spread, fd, is shown in Fig. 7. The value,
fd = 100 Hz, is the typical Doppler spread in vehicular
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Fig. 5. Mutual information change versus pilot length lp. γab = 10 dB,
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I(ĥab, ĥae) I(hab, hae)
ChSK
(a) Slow fading channel with fd = 10 Hz.
1e-05 0.0001 0.001 0.01  0.1   
Time delay τ (s)
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
M
ut
ua
l I
nf
or
m
at
io
n
C ĥSK
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Fig. 6. Mutual information change versus time delay τ . γab = 10 dB,
lp = 10, β = 0.1, and ∆d = 0.2.
communications and therefore key generation is workable in
most of the application scenarios with a less dynamic channel.
Secret key capacity characterizes the information amount that
can be extracted in one realization and is not affected by the
sampling period, Ts.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter systematically investigated the secret key capac-
ity of key generation from wireless channels by considering
effects of sampling delay and eavesdropping in a source
model. We found that secret key capacity is determined by
the cross correlation coefficients of the channel measurements
and a better legitimate channel is not required. We analyzed
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Fig. 7. Mutual information change versus Doppler shift fd. γab = 10 dB,
lp = 10, τ = 0.001 s, β = 0.1, and ∆d = 0.2.
the effects of all the relevant parameters, including sampling
delay, eavesdroppers’ location, qualities of legitimate and
eavesdropping channels, Doppler spread, and pilot length. Key
generation design guidelines were provided to achieve a high
and positive secret key capacity.
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